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I. Introduction 
 
1.1  World merchandise trade has continued to grow at a faster pace compared to world 
production throughout the post-war period inspite of periodic downturns in the global 
economy. This increased trade orientation is not novel in many respects. It has merely meant 
the return of the world trade to the "normal" or "golden" levels before those were interrupted 
by the two world wars and the Great Depression (ARAKI and MARCEAU, 1998 sic). The 
heightened perception today about international trade is due, mainly, to its phenomenal rise 
since World War II.  
 
1.2  "Globalisation" and "liberalisation" have become the buzzwords of international 
trading arena over the past few years. These twin processes are said to have opened up "vast 
new opportunities" for economic and social progress in developing countries through greater 
integration into the world economy. However, integration into the world economy does not 
come without actual or potential costs. These costs are not only economic in nature. There 
can be social costs too in the form of marginalisation of individuals or social groups that are 
not equipped to take advantage of new opportunities and challenges created by globalisation 
and liberalisation. 
 
1.3  Developing countries of the Asian and Pacific region have actively participated in the 
global economy in areas of trade, investment and finance. However, owing to a wide 
diversity in their economic and socio-political circumstances, the levels and pace of 
integration have differed. As a result, the impact of globalisation has varied significantly. The 
more industrialised East Asian economies have almost fully integrated into the world 
economy and have been benefited "enormously" from globalisation. South-East Asian 
countries on the other hand, have had a more mixed outcome as witnessed in recent years. In 
South Asian countries, economic reforms in the 1990s have stimulated their integration, 
although it is by no means of the same depth and scope as in South-East Asia. Overall, the 
level of integration of South Asia is much lower than that of the East Asian and South-East 
Asian Countries (ESCAP, 2000).  
 
1.4  The least developed countries (LDCs) in general, and these of the Asia-Pacific region 
in particular, have largely remained unintegrated. Despite their efforts to deregulate and 
liberalise their policy regimes with a view to greater participation in the international division 
of labour, their capacity to do so is limited. The small size of their economies, the poor state 
of development of their transportation and communication infrastructure, their disadvantaged 
geographical locations, often far away from the major metropolitan centres of international 
trade and finance place formidable constraints on their integration into the globalisation and 
liberalisation processes. However, in order to make the global trading system truly global, it 
is imperative for these countries to become an integral part of this system without being 
further marginalised. One of the mechanisms by which the LDCs can be integrated 
effectively into the world trading system on a fair and equitable basis is through 
strengthening Special and Differential (S&D) measures in favour of them. 
 
II.  Evolution of S&D Measures 
 
2.1  There was no multilateral rule and discipline on international trade until the middle of 
the 20th century. It was only after the world had witnessed the scourge of the Great 
Depression and World War II, that the need was felt for multilateralised and institutionalised 
trading rules. The unsuccessful attempt to create an International Trade Organisation (ITO) 
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immediately after the World War II left the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), negotiated in 1947, as the sole legal instrument governing international trade on a 
provisional basis. Very soon, the GATT became the central forum where international trade 
relations evolved continuously. This state of affairs continued till 1995, when the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) became operational. Since then WTO has been providing the 
trading nations with an authentic international trade organisation administering various 
multilateral agreements. 
 
2.2  In the initial years, GATT did not oblige its developed contracting parties to adopt 
any particular preferential policy towards developing countries (ROESSLER, 1985). In this 
context HOEKMAN and KOSTECKI (1995) identifies three stages in developing countries' 
participation in the multilateral trading system: 
 
a)  1947-64: small-scale membership of low-income countries in GATT based on a formal 
parity of obligations,  
b)  1964-86: broadening of developing country membership based on the concept of "more 
favourable and differential" treatment; and  
c)  1986 -  : deepening integration of developing countries into the GATT-WTO system with 
reciprocal responsibilities. 
 
2.3  The concept of giving preferential treatment to developing countries gained 
prominence in the mid-1950s when a large number of colonies started becoming independent. 
The import substitution trade policies followed by developing countries during this early 
period gave rise to requests for changes in the multilateral trading system in the following 
four areas: 
•  improved market access for developing country exports of manufactured goods to 
developed country markets through the provision of trade preferences; 
•  non-reciprocity, or less than full reciprocity, in trade relations between developing 
countries and developed countries with a view to allowing developing countries to 
maintain protection that was deemed necessary to promote development;  
•  flexibility in the application of trade rules by developing country members of GATT 
disciplines for the same reason; and  
•  stabilisation of world commodity prices. (MICHALOPOULOS, 2000)  
 
Prebisch was the most notable proponent of differential treatment for developing countries. 
He argued that developing countries needed protection to achieve industrialisation and 
development. He went further to propagate that a "new world trade order" was required to 
break the "vicious circle of underdevelopment". International trade was seen as an instrument 
of exploitation and self - sufficiency as beneficial. The institutional expression of this line of 
thinking was embodied in the founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. Significantly, Prebisch became the first Secretary General 
of UNCTAD.  
 
2.4.  Founding of UNCTAD and activism of Prebisch and others put GATT under 
considerable pressure to do something in favour of the developing countries.  In 1965, 
developing country's demands for special status in the multilateral trading system led to the 
adoption of Part IV of the GATT. Part IV, entitled Trade and Development, came into force 
in 1966. Articles of this Part are primarily expressions of goals and impose few concrete 
obligations. Article XXXVI states that contracting parties are to provide "in the largest 
possible measure more favourable and acceptable market access conditions for products of 
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export interest to developing countries". It goes on to specify that during trade negotiations, 
developing country members should not be expected to make concessions, which are 
inconsistent with their level of development. Article XXXVII calls for the highest priority to 
be given to the elimination of restrictions, which differentiate unreasonably between primary 
and processed products. Article XXXVIII calls for joint action of contracting parties, through 
international arrangements, with a view to improving market access for products of export 
interest to developing countries. Thus none of the provisions of Part IV legally bound 
developed countries to undertake specific actions in favour of developing countries. 
Nevertheless, this Part has been relied on legal and policy argumentation in GATT, and has 
had considerable influence (JACKSON, 1997). Part IV launched the Special and Differential 
(S&D) measures in favour of the developing countries that reigned supreme for the next three 
decades.  Developing countries were not expected to grant tariff concessions and bind tariffs. 
Instead, they were granted the "privilege" of free riding through the operation of the MFN 
principle. Developing countries successfully invoked Part IV as cover for not engaging in 
reciprocal reductions of trade barriers.  
 
2.5. The principle of non-reciprocity, which formed the cornerstone of the S&D measures, 
got a further boost during the Tokyo Round (1973 -79). The 1973 Ministerial Meeting that 
finalised the agenda of the Tokyo Round stated that he MTN should secure "additional 
benefits" for developing countries in order to achieve a substantial increase in their foreign 
exchange earnings, diversification of their exports, and an acceleration of the rate of growth 
of their trade. It reaffirmed the principle of non-reciprocity by reiterating that the developed 
countries "should not expect reciprocal concessions from developing economies".  Among 
the outcomes of the Tokyo Round of MTN was a Framework Agreement, which enshrined 
the now-famous "Enabling Clause". Formally titled as "Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries", it provided for the 
departures from MFN and other GATT Rules. Specifically it provides for:  
•  the preferential market access of developing countries to developed country markets on a 
non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory basis; 
•  'more favourable' treatment for developing countries in other GATT rules dealing with 
non-tariff barriers;  
•  the introduction of preferential trade regimes between developing countries; and  
•  the special treatment of least developed countries in the context of specific measures for 
developing countries. 
 
The Enabling Clause provided the legal basis for the operation of the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP), established under the auspices of UNCTAD, and arguably the most 
tangible form of S & D. The Enabling Clause also codified the principles, practices and 
procedures regarding the use of trade measures for BoP purposes, and provided developing 
countries "flexibility" in applying trade measures to meet their "essential development 
needs". All in all, the Enabling Clause may be regarded as "a great leap forward" in respect of 
S & D measures for developing countries. In bringing together the key elements of 
preferential market access, non-reciprocity, and flexibility in the implementation of GATT 
rules and commitments, the Enabling Clause was a summation of all the efforts made since 
1954 within the multilateral trading system.  (MICHALO POULOS, 2000) 
 
2.6.  It has often been suggested that not benevolence, but narrow self-interest prompted 
the developed countries to grant non-reciprocal S & D measures to the developing countries. 
The basic objective of the developed countries seems to have been the progressive integration 
into the GATT system of developing countries with large markets or substantial trade and 
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growth levels. Prevalent political climate of the time also played a role in the acceptance of S 
& D. Some developed countries believed that insistence on reciprocal obligations might push 
developing countries closer to the Soviet block (KOSTECKI, 1979). A concerted decision by 





III.  S & D Measures in Uruguay Round and WTO 
 
 
3.1  The establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 01 January 1995 
"marked the biggest reform of international trade since the Second World War" (WTO, 
1998). It also brought into reality the failed attempt to create an International Trade 
Organisation in 1948. WTO has also been described as the "third leg of the Bretton Woods 
stool " or the previously "missing link" from international economic institutions  (JACKSON, 
1997). Establishment of WTO was one of the most tangible outcomes of the Uruguay Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations.  
 
3.2  The Uruguay Round (UR) was launched in September 1986 at Punta del Este (in 
Uruguay) and was scheduled to end in Brussels in December 1990. But ultimately it 
continued for seven and a half years. It was not only the largest trade negotiation ever, but 
also " probably the largest negotiation of any kind in history". When it concluded, it covered 
almost all trade, "from toothbrushes to pleasure boats, from banking to telecommunications, 
from the genes of wild rice to AIDS treatments". It took until 15 December 1993 for every 
issue to be finally resolved and for negotiations on market access for goods and services to be 
concluded. On 15 April 1994, the deal was signed by Ministers from 125 countries at a 
meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco. On 01 January 1995, the World Trade Organisation came 
into existence.  
 
3.3  In the UR, a major shift occurred in both the strategy and tactics of the developing 
countries. They actively participated in the MTN and were strongly involved in shaping the 
WTO Agreements. Unlike previous rounds of MTNs, the UR was agreed to be a "single 
undertaking" and all Agreements were to apply to all members. This meant that not only the 
developing countries, but also the LDCs were obliged to engage in reciprocal exchange of 
concessions. This, however, does not mean that S&D is dead.  Ending S & D was not on the 
UR agenda. In fact, more than 100 of the WTO's 137 members are developing countries. 
Included in this figure is 29 of the 48 LDCs.  So the developing and the least developed 
countries are going to play an increasingly important role in the WTO. 
 
3.4  The Uruguay Round also saw an evolution of developing country attitudes regarding 
S&D measures. The UR Agreements continued to be guided by the general S&D principles 
agreed on previous Negotiating Rounds and extended them in a number of ways. Without 
formally giving up the principle of non-reciprocity, developing countries eschewed past 
practices and participated more actively in the exchange of reciprocal liberalisation in goods 
and services. At the same time, Special and Differential provisions regarding market access 
through GSP were maintained. Flexibility was also maintained by permitting developing 
countries certain practices in support of agriculture that were not allowed to developed 
countries and similarly regarding export subsidies. The UR Agreements introduced new 
elements of S&D by providing for transitional time frames and technical assistance in the 
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implementation of the various agreements. The basic reason underlying the extension of S&D 
treatment through these two new elements was that developing countries did not have the 
institutional capacity to implement the commitments demanded by them in some of the new 
areas covered by WTO.   
 
3.5  There are also several conceptual premises underlying the provision of S&D as it has 
emerged over time and as has reflected in the WTO Agreements. The most important one is 
that developing countries are intrinsically disadvantaged in their participation in international 
trade. Therefore, any multilateral agreement involving developing and developed countries 
must take into account this intrinsic weakness in specifying this rights and responsibilities. A 
related premise has been that the trade policies that would maximise sustainable development 
in developing countries are different from those in developed economies and hence policy 
disciplines applying to the latter should not apply to the former. The final premise is that it is 
the interest of the developed countries to assist developing countries in their fuller integration 
and participation in the international trading system (MICHALOPOULOS, 1998).     
 
3.6  The Agreements, Understandings, Legal Instruments, and Ministerial Decisions 
emanating from the UR contain as many as 97 S & D provisions in respect of the developing 
and the least developed countries. (WTO, 2000). A comprehensive synoptic table listing the S 
& D measures concerning the LDCs may be seen at Annex I. In general, the S&D provisions 
referring to the developing and the least developed countries may be broadly grouped under 
four headings (GATT, 1994): 
 
   
ρ  those which recognise the interests  of the developing and the least  developed countries. 
ρ  those  which require developing and the least developed countries to meet  fewer   
obligations.  
ρ  those that provide a longer time frame  for the implementation  of certain obligations, and 
ρ  those  that provide for technical assistance. 
 
It should be noted that provisions relating to developing countries also apply to the LDCs. 
But provisions specifically aimed at LDCs do not apply to the developing countries.  
 
 
3.7  The following Agreements/ Decisions/ Agreements/Understandings/ Declarations 
contain one or more types of S & D measures listed above: 
 
1.  Ministerial Decision on Measures in Favour of the Least Developed Countries (all four). 
2.  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (only recognition of interests). 
3.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (all four). 
4.  Agreement on Agriculture (recognition of interests, and fewer obligations). 
5.  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (recognition of 
interests, implementation period and technical assistance). 
6.  Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (recognition of interests, and implementation 
period) 
7.  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (all four). 
8.  Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (recognition of interest, fewer 
obligations and implementation period). 
9.  Agreement on Implementation of Articles VI of GATT: Anti Dumping (only recognition 
of interests).  
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10. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT: Customs Valuation (all four) 
11. Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection (recognition of interests and technical assistance) 
12. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures (recognition of interests, fewer obligations 
and implementation period) 
13. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  (recognition of interests, fewer 
obligations and implementation period). 
14. Agreement on Safeguards (recognition of interests and fewer obligations) 
15.  General Agreement on Trade in Services (all four). 
16. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (recognition of 
interests, implementation period and technical assistance). 
17. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(recognition of interests and technical assistance) 
18. Trade Policy Review Mechanism (fewer obligations and technical assistance) 
19. Ministerial Declaration on the Contributions of the WTO to Achieving Greater Coherence 
in Global Policy Making (only-recognition of interests) 
20. Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the 
Reform Programme on Least Developed and Net Food Importing Developing Countries 
(recognition of interests and technical assistance). 
21. Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures (only technical assistance). 
 
3.8  A few descriptive examples of S&D measures contained in various WTO Agreements 
are given below: 
 
a)  Recognition of Interests: 
 
Members of the World Trade Organisation recognise that one of the objectives of the WTO 
will be to ensure that, the developing country members in general and the least developed 
country members in particular, secure a share in the growth of international trade that is 
commensurate with their economic development needs. They also recognise that this 
objective will require a number of positive efforts from all members. (Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation: Preamble). 
 
b)  Fewer obligations: 
 
Least developed countries are not required to undertake reduction commitments in any area 
of the negotiations (Agreement on Agriculture: Article 15:2) 
 
c)  Implementation Period: 
 
The least developed countries may delay the application of all of the provisions of the 
Agreement related to their measures affecting imports for a period of five years following the 
entry into force of the WTO (Agreement on the Application of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures: Article 14) 
 
d)  Technical Assistance: 
 
Technical assistance and advice, especially for developing country members, will be 
provided by Members upon request on mutually agreed terms and conditions. Priority shall 
be given to the needs of the least developed countries in providing technical assistance 
(Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: Article 11) 
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IV.  A Brief Evaluation of S&D Measures 
 
4.1  As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the S&D measures are not provisions of 
a specific agreement, say the TRIPS or TRIMS Agreement. Instead, S&D measures are a set 
of ill-defined, vague and what is most important, unenforceable clauses unlike the other 
provisions of the WTO Agreements. These have, therefore, been described widely as "honest 
endeavours" and "pious wishes measures" dependent ultimately on the autonomous wishes of 
the benefit giving country. Benefits granted under them could be introduced and terminated at 
will by the benefit giver. Besides their implementation could be made contingent upon 
fulfilment of conditionalities in diverse areas such as environment, human/animal rights etc 
among others. However it has been argued that a strong case can be made that provisions for 
flexibility in implementing obligations arising out of WTO Agreements, unlike the provisions 
calling for developed country actions, are legally enforceable (KESSIE, 2000).   
 
4.2  While the principle of S&D treatment has been imbedded in many of the WTO 
Agreements, the practice of S&D continues to suffer from the same shortcomings that 
were evident at the beginning of the Uruguay Round. Three main problem areas have 
emerged:  
 
  the commitments of developed countries regarding preferential market access and other 
treatment are in practice much less important than they appear to be on paper;  
  there is increasing questioning of one of the fundamental premises of S&D, namely, that 
less liberal trade policies are optimal for developing countries; and  
  the commitments aimed at addressing developing countries institutional constraints have 
been made without serious planning of how they will be implemented 
(MICHALOPOULOS, 2000)  
 
Regarding preferential market access, the preferences provided under the GSP have been 
eroded as a consequence of the MFN reductions of tariffs under the UR. Another, and 
perhaps more important development has been the emergence of regional arrangements 
between developed and developing countries (e.g. NAFTA) providing deeper and more 
secure preferences. Regarding the matter of flexibility in the implementation of WTO 
commitments, the 1990's have witnessed a growing body of analytical and empirical work 
which attacked the very premise on which exceptions from WTO disciplines is based, namely 
that higher levels of protection and subsidisation of exports are conducive to development. 
According to this line of thinking, this protection has introduced distortions in domestic 
resource allocation, encouraged rent seeking and waste and adversely affected growth in 
productivity and sustainable development. However, it must be noted that the findings linking 
lower protection to faster development continue to be controversial, especially regarding the 
direction of causality (RODRIK, 1992, EDWARDS, 1993).  
 
4.3  There is an increasing recognition that institutions in developing countries, including 
those that are supposed to implement trade policies are weak and need to be strengthened. In 
addition, supply side constraints create important impediments to participate effectively in 
international trade. But as with many other elements of S&D, technical assistance provisions 
seem to have been negotiated without much involvement of developing country's officials 
familiar with how long it takes to build institutional capacity where it is inadequate or totally 
lacking. Thus one of the key issues for LDCs in S&D measures is how to ensure concrete and 
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effective support for trade-related capacity building measures in all areas linked with 
international trade. At the same time, it is important for LDCs to recognise some of the 
pitfalls of past developing country experienced with flexibility in the application of WTO 
rules and disciplines. Existing S&D provisions permit LDCs the most freedom of policy 
choice possible, in areas such as subsidies that they can least afford.    
 
4.4  The general feeling of the LDCs is that S&D measures were hollow promises in the 
first place. They feel bitter that they were lulled into a sense of smugness during the UR and 
failed to realise the consequences of a binding "single undertaking" such as the WTO. By and 
large, S&D measures have generally been granted under the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) scheme and other specific arrangements (e.g. Lome) which vary in 
application from country to country and from commodity to commodity. The recent 
introduction by the US of the Sub-Saharan African Trade and Development Bill and the 
revamping of the Caribbean Basin Initiative are stark examples of discriminatory and 
autonomous trade regimes. The EU is also in two minds regarding renewal of the Lome 
Convention (McQUEEN et al, 1998). This has led one Geneva based LDC diplomat to 
conclude that "there is not much to be hoped for in practical terms from the S&D facilities 
under the present multilateral arrangements including in WTO". It is widely held that S&D 
measures have not yielded many tangible results and had led developing countries to accept a 
dilution of S&D provisions in return for improved market access to developed country 
markets. In addition, it is argued that many potential S&D benefits have been outweighed by 
losses due to protectionist arrangements of developed countries in agriculture and textiles 
sectors.  
 
4.5  In recent times, there have been some ominous developments centring the S&D 
measures. An underlying tension has been created between the developing countries and the 
LDCs on this issue. The OECD countries, being fully aware that granting some concessions 
to the LDCs would not matter much, given the low trading level of these countries, are 
willing to extend some facilities to the LDCs in the forthcoming round of MTN. But they 
would not like to do the same without some cost to the leading developing countries such as 
India, Brazil, Argentina etc. It may be recalled here that both Part IV of GATT and the 
Enabling Clause encourage developing countries to extend S&D treatment to imports from 
LDCs (ITC, 1999). These top echelon developing countries, therefore, have started viewing 
the LDCs "as a sort of burden" in their negotiating strategy with the developed countries. 
They suspect that the LDCs may be "bought over" with small concessions, by the rich 
countries thus breaking the rank of the developing countries in their fight for better terms 
from the OECD in the ensuing trade round. 
 
4.6  In any new round of MTN, LDCs should be able to continue to hold on to and build 
further on the concept of S&D. This is the considered opinion of knowledgeable trade 
diplomats in Geneva. But for this, LDCs must develop an independent position of their own 
distinct from the highly political and often confrontational stance taken by some developing 
countries. LDCs must be realistic and acknowledge their true position in world trade. They 
should seek to derive benefit from the developed countries purely on trading terms. They 
must not become engrossed in regional and global politics. It is also expected that S&D 
provisions will be built into the Agreements arising out of the new issues or emerging 
agenda. But such arrangements are more likely to be limited within LDCs only. The 
developing countries are likely to oppose such an arrangement. They would like to ride piggy 
- back on the LDCs and try to reap as much benefit as they can from the new Round. This 
may turn out to be a "big problem" for the LDCs in the new round. With a view to avoiding 
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such an outcome LDCs should open dialogue with the developed countries directly and 
preferably independent of the position of the developing countries. 
 
 
1 V.  S&D Measures in Future Trade Negotiations  
 
 
5.1  In future negotiations, the challenge facing developing countries would be 
twofold:  
 
¾  to maintain existing S&D measures where these are crucial to the success of 
development programmes; and  
¾  adapt the concept of S&D to the realities of globalisation and liberalisation 
(GIBBS, 2000) 
 
Although the progress in multilateral tariff liberalisation and the extension of the regional 
agreements among developed, and between developed and developing countries will continue 
to erode preferential tariff margins, GSP and other unilateral schemes are needed to maintain 
access to markets and to reduce marginalisation. All developing countries cannot participate 
in North-South free trade areas, and thus GSP treatment should be maintained and extended 
to ensure that the most vulnerable of them are not adversely affected.  
 
5.2  Most S&D treatments in the form of exemptions (from UR Agreements obligations) 
would be phased out by 2005. This should not make us lose sight of the fact that Article 
XVIII, Part IV and the Enabling Clause remain as integral parts of GATT 1994. Special and 
Differential treatment can, therefore, be pursued through seeking extension and revision of 
the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreements in the context of the "built-in" agenda. Key 
areas, in this respect, could be identified in the Agreements on inter alia, TRIMs, agriculture, 
and subsidies (GIBBS, 2000).  
 
5.3  Preserving and adapting S&D in future negotiations would involve recognition that 
the basic elements of the Enabling Clause are still relevant and could be consolidated by their 
restatement and adaptation to the current context. In addition, financial assistance should be 
an important element of S&D in future to enable the developing and the least developed 
countries to implement the obligations and exercise their rights. Experience has shown that 
without financial assistance, the possibilities of many LDCs to fully meet their obligations 
and fully exercise their rights are very limited. Finally, S&D treatment in the context of 
globalisation should give heavy emphasis on "supply side measures" aimed at developing a 
competitive capacity at the national level. Support for this can be drawn from the experience 
of the East Asian countries whose success in increasing their participation in the globalised 
world economy have been due largely to their successful use of policy instruments to build 
competitive export supply capacities and to encourage product diversification.  
 
5.4  The approach to S&D in the future will have to take account of the realities of the 
globalised production and be directed to assist developing and least developed countries’s 
enterprises to derive benefits from and successfully confront the challenges of globalisation. 
In addition to ensuring improved and more stable access to markets, this would require 
                                                           
1 This section draws quite substantially upon Murray Gibbs' paper on "Special and Differential Treatment in the 
Context of Globalisation" presented at G-15 Symposium on Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO 
Agreements held at New Delhi on 10 December 1998 (Gibbs, 2000). 
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obtaining access to technology, an objective that is closely related to that of access to 
information networks and distribution systems. Thus, in the context of globalisation, LDCs 
should emphasise on building up strong enterprises, which will be able to compete in the 
world market for both goods and services. This would seem to require less emphasis on 
"infant industry" tariff protection and more on subsidies and various performance 
requirements to encourage developing country firms to enter the world market, to underwrite 
some of the costs and risks of their doing so and to give them the means to compete in terms 
of technology and access to networks.  
 
5.5  In fine, in future trade negotiations, S&D treatment may be pursued through:  
•  a restatement of the main elements of the Enabling Clause, adapted to current 
realities; and  
•  a "carve out" of essential policy measures aimed at strengthening the 
competitiveness of developing country enterprises from the disciplines of future 
multilateral trade agreements (GIBBS, 2000).   
 
 
VI.  A Brief Digression into the Concept of "Non-reciprocity" 
 
6.1  It has been said, "the fundamental dynamic of the GATT was and remains 
reciprocity" (HOEKMAN and KOSTECKI, 1995). But as the developing countries, and later 
the LDCs, found themselves disadvantaged in this game of reciprocity, they raised the 
demand for special and differential measures. As a result Part IV was added to GATT in 1965 
(becoming effective in 1966). Part IV (particularly Article XXXVI:8) explicitly stated that 
developing countries would not be required to make the same concessions on tariffs, or the 
removal of non-tariff barriers as developed countries. Part IV thus defined non-reciprocity for 
the developing countries. The Ministerial Meeting that launched the Tokyo Round in 1973 
also confirmed that the developed countries should not expect reciprocal concessions from 
developing economies. The Enabling Clause adopted during the Tokyo Round not only 
reaffirmed the principle of non-reciprocity, it also provided a legal basis for this principle by 
authorising the operationalisation of GSP. Thus it may be argued that non-reciprocity has 
been the cornerstone of the S&D measures for well over three decades. In fact countries such 
as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore could attain the status of "newly 
industrialised countries" through exploiting fully to their benefit the non-reciprocal benefits 
offered to them by the developed countries. Countries such as India, China and Indonesia 
could also benefit substantially from non-reciprocal benefits. 
 
6.2  Apart from the Generalised System of Preference (GSP), other unilaterally 
determined non-reciprocal preferential trade schemes include:  
⇒  the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act (CBERA), also known as the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), enacted by the USA in favour of 24 Central American and  Caribbean 
countries and territories washed by the Caribbean Sea; 
⇒  the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)  promulgated by the USA in favour of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru ; and  
⇒  the Canadian Trade, Investment and Industrial Cooperation programme (CARIBCAN) 
enacted in favour of 18  Commonwealth Caribbean countries and territories.  
 
Several non-reciprocal preferential schemes were also negotiated and agreed upon jointly by 
the preference - giving and preference - receiving countries. These include the four 
successive Lome conventions between the 15 EU countries and 71 countries in the African, 
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Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. Another is the South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) between Australia and New Zealand and 
13 island country members of the South Pacific forum. The main difference between the 
unilateral and negotiated non-reciprocal preferential schemes is that the agreed preferences in 
the latter become contractual obligations that cannot be unilaterally modified by one of the 
parties (ONGUGLO, 1999).  
 
6.3  Non-reciprocal preferential schemes have proved to be resilient and durable 
instruments of development cooperation. A number of factors have, however, combined to 
produce mixed results for the non-reciprocal trade preferential schemes. The non-reciprocal 
schemes contain too many complications pertaining to restrictive, complex and varying rules 
of origin, quotas, and designation criteria that need to be simplified and harmonised where 
appropriate. Other deficiencies include the exclusion of sensitive products which are of 
export interest to developing countries, mismatch between exports of beneficiaries and 
coverage of preferences, and non-economic conditionalities.  Supply-side constraints have 
been another source of difficulty with most developing countries export profiles being 
dominated by a few commodities and minerals. But overall, it could be said that non-
reciprocal preferences have created more favourable market access conditions and 
progressively stimulated trade growth in some preference receiving countries although the 
extent and dispersion of these benefits has been unequal (ONGUGLO, 1999).   
   
6.4  In recent times, however, some arguments are being put forward for the elimination of 
this principle of non-reciprocity. It has been suggested that non-reciprocity and its corollary-- 
free riding-- is not beneficial to developing countries (HINDLEY, 1987). It has even been 
suggested that issues of major concern to the developing countries such as the trade in textiles 
and clothing could not be brought under GATT rules because of the principle of non-
reciprocity. Moreover, under the non-reciprocity principle, preferences were granted 
unilaterally, and could be removed unilaterally. This contributed to uncertainty and 
unpredictability. It has also been suggested that pursuing non-reciprocity had been counter 
productive and had delayed adjustment process and encouraged the maintenance of policies 
that favoured narrow interest groups. 
 
6.5  On the other hand, it has been argued, "as a matter of economic policy, reciprocity 
does not make much sense" (JACKSON, 1997). It is possible for a country to gain welfare 
advantage even by reducing its tariffs unilaterally (KENEN, 1985). The principle of 
reciprocity has, in fact, been used as a political tool to persuade other countries to reduce their 
tariffs and remove the tariff barriers. The reciprocity issue raises problems of measurement 
and is very difficult to use in negotiating non-tariff measures. 
 
6.6  The greatest challenge facing the WTO today is the fullest integration of the 
developing and the least developed countries into the multilateral trading system. These 
countries expect the WTO to help keeping foreign markets open and provide them with 
opportunities to catch-up with their more advanced trading partners. In order to make 
international trade a positive-sum game for all, developing countries in general, and the 
LDCs in particular, would need the continuous support on a non-reciprocal basis. 
 
6.7.  As stated earlier, the focussing of non-reciprocal trade benefits on LDCs was 
sanctioned by the GATT in the Enabling Clause of 1979. The WTO has added new focus 
with the decision of the First WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996 and the results of the 
WTO-sponsored High Level Meeting on LDCs Trade Development in 1997. Consequently 
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recent revisions in several GSP schemes have substantially improved benefits for LDCs. 
These include in Canada, EU, Japan and the United States, duty-free access for those 
products that are covered by their respective schemes. In addition, the range of GSP-eligible 
products from LDCs have been extended in some schemes.  
 
6.8  The utilisation of non-reciprocal trade preferences may decline in the globalising and 
liberalising economy of the 21
st century. Nonetheless, until their commercial value is totally 
eliminated, non-reciprocal preferences would remain valid options for promoting trade 
expansion and industrial development in the developing and the least developed countries. 
Many of these countries have yet to achieve a high level of international competitiveness and 
maturity in their production and administrative structures, which is necessary to enhance their 
capacity to participate in reciprocal trade agreements with industrialised countries. Such 
capacities are difficult to develop in the short run. In such a backdrop, the notion of 
reciprocity appears premature at present (ONGUGLO, 1999). Non-reciprocal concessions, 
therefore, continue to be an important aspect of all trade and investment strategies aimed at 
integrating the developing and the least developed countries into the global trading system. In 
this context, it must not be forgotten that non-reciprocal preferences originated as an aspect 
of the wider concept of Special and Differential Treatment for the developing countries. The 
maintenance and the improvement of non-reciprocal concessions in the new trading 
environment should be underpinned by this concept rather than being viewed as a unilateral 
concession.    
 
 
VII.  The Way Forward 
 
7.1  Strengthening capacities in developing countries (including the LDCs) to participate 
in the institutional structures of the WTO and also to get access into the global market place 
has now been widely accepted as one of the prerequisites for the success of the global trading 
system (BHATTACHARYA and RAHMAN, 2000). This could be done in a number of ways 
some of which are discussed below:  
 
a)  Creation of an LDC Division in WTO  
 
At present the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) is mandated to look after the 
concerns of LDCs. This Committee is a subsidiary body of the WTO's General Council. It 
has created a Sub-Committee on LDCs. Neither the CTD nor the Sub-Committee on LDCs 
has any teeth. So it is proposed that a full-fledged LDC Division may be created at WTO 
headed by a Deputy Director General. Support for such a systematic annual review, which 
reviews donor commitments, assistance and other measures taken in favour of developing 
countries, and LDCs may be found in existing literature on the issue (WHALLEY, 1999). It 
should be vested with powers to monitor implementation of S&D provisions by developed 
countries. Any non-compliance should result in automatic authorisation of retaliatory 
measures (including cross-retaliation) by WTO General Council against the offender. At the 
same time the LDC Division at UNCTAD should be revived and strengthened so that it could 
provide useful intellectual inputs for LDCs whether in respect of participating in MTNs, or 
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b)  Making S&D Measures Mandatory 
 
At present S&D measures incorporated in different WTO Agreements are not legally 
enforceable. So, the LDCs have to depend on the whims of the developed countries for their 
implementation. As a result, even in such a non-contentious area as providing technical 
assistance, not much compliance is visible. Consequently, there is strong demand from the 
developing and the least developed countries for making the S&D measures mandatory in 
nature. This would mean that any non-compliance would attract retaliation. As has been 
suggested in the preceding paragraph, such retaliation should kick in automatically. 
 
c)  Duty-free, Quota-free Access of LDC Exportables 
  
Lowering of tariff rates in successive MTNs has resulted in serious erosion of traditional 
preferential market access mechanisms such as the GSP scheme or the Lome Convention. As 
a result, to maintain a semblance of preferential market access, duty-free and quota-free 
access of all exports from LDCs to both the developed and developing country markets 
should be incorporated as a binding commitment in all WTO schedules. 
 
A recent development in this respect has been the announcement of the "Everything but Arms 
(EBA)" initiative by the European Union in September 2000. Under the EBA initiative, the 
EU will grant "duty-free access without any quantitative restrictions to products originating 
in the least developed countries." (EC, 2000). This proposal is now awaiting approval by the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The original target date for putting into 
effect the EBA initiative was 01 January 2001, which could not be adhered to because of 
reported opposition to the initiative by some member countries of the EU. Bangladesh has 
mounted a strong campaign so that the EBA initiative is put into effect before the Third UN 
Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Brussels in May 2001.  
 
An attempt at critical evaluation of the EBA initiative shows that the proposal falls short of 
the LDC demands and expectations. The LDCs have been demanding bound commitments 
from the developed countries for duty-free and quota-free access for all LDC goods. In the 
EBA initiative, unfortunately, there is no element of binding commitments. The EBA 
initiative is to be put into effect by amending the existing EU GSP scheme, which is due to 
expire on 31 December 2001. As has been noted elsewhere in this paper, GSP is a unilateral 
trade preference granted by the developed countries to the developing countries. Hence, if the 
EBA initiative is revoked at any future date by EU, the LDCs would have no legal basis to 
contest the issue before WTO or any other forum. Secondly, the EU is proposing to "put in 
place stronger safeguard measures" before operationalising EBA initiative. Under these 
measures, tariff concessions would be suspended "in cases of fraud, failure to adhere to the 
rules of origin and/or huge increases in imports into the community." Thirdly, the EU would 
apply the existing stringent GSP Rules of Origin to the EBA initiative. It may be recalled that 
many beneficiary countries are unable to meet the existing GSP Rules of Origin. The EU 
refused to develop new (and more relaxed) Rules of Origin for the EBA initiative on the 
ground that such a move "would go against Community moves of recent years to simplify 
and harmonise the various rules of origin in force". 
 
Examining the business implications of the EBA initiative, we find that "over 99% of 
community trade with the LDCs already carried zero import duty, either under the Lome 
Convention or under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)". Thus in 1998, goods 
worth EUR 8, 113 million was eligible for duty-free entry into the EU countries out of a total 
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of EUR 8,136 million imported from LDCs. According to calculations by EU "the total 
import value of the products covered by the Commission proposal is about EUR 77.7 




The main significance of the EBA initiative appears to be political rather than economic. The 
putting into effect of the initiative by EU would put other Quad countries on the spot to adopt 
similar measures of their own in favour of the LDCs. Moreover, the EBA initiative may have 
dynamic and long-term effect on spurring trade on new products for the LDCs. Overall it is a 
welcome move.   
  
d) Improving  the  Quality  of Technical Assistance  
 
Providing technical assistance (TA) is considered to be the least controversial of all S&D 
measures, as it did not require any trade preference or concessions. Between 1995 and 1999, 
WTO's TA activities have increased nearly five-fold. However, most of these TA activities 
have dealt with "soft" issues such as holding traditional national or regional seminars on 
various WTO Agreements. Another constraining factor has been the fact that 90% or more of 
all TA provided by WTO are "financed through extra-budgetary contributions" (WTO, 2000). 
So with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of TA, two main issues need to be addressed: 
 
♦  developing a convenient and systematic approach towards TA, and  
♦  securing a more predictable and sustainable financial base for TA activities. 
 
It has also been suggested that the present "soft" TA needed to be complemented by "hard" 
modes of assistance, such as trade-related infrastructure support. 
 
It has been said that the main differences between developed and developing countries are not 
in the trade policies they should pursue, but in the capacities of their institutions to pursue 
them. This means that S&D provisions related to technical and financial assistance should be 
followed up. Explicit legally binding commitments regarding technical and financial 
assistance need to be obtained. Legal obligations developing and least developed countries 
have assumed in the WTO Agreements need to be balanced by legal commitments of the 
developed countries to fund the assistance needed to implement them. One way of doing this 
is through a large expansion of the WTO budget for technical cooperation.  
 
e)  Reviving the Integrated Framework  
 
The First Ministerial Conference of WTO held in Singapore in December 1996, adopted the 
Comprehensive and Integrated WTO Plan of Action for the Least Developed Countries. The 
Plan of Action sought to improve the overall capacity of the LDCs to respond to the 
challenges and opportunities offered by the multilateral trading system. It also envisaged 
closer co-operation between WTO and other multilateral agencies assisting LDCs in the area 
of trade. Pursuant to this, the WTO High-Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least 
Developed Countries' Trade Development was held in Geneva in October 1997. A major 
outcome of the Meeting was the adoption of the Integrated Framework for Trade-related 
Technical Assistance. Six core agencies, namely, the IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, World 
                                                           
2 For a full description of the EBA initiative please see EC (2000): Amendment to Council Regulation No 
2820/98 (Everything but Arms). 
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Bank and WTO, were directly involved in giving a concrete outcome to the IF process. Ten 
out of the 13 LDCs of the Asia-Pacific region participated in the process (ESCAP, 2000). 
After a detailed need assessment study made with the cooperation of the sponsoring agencies, 
a multi-year programme (MYP) of capacity enhancing projects had been prepared by 
Bangladesh and presented to the donors. The IF seeks to address the shortcomings related to 
technical and institutional capacity, particularly in the areas of trade policy, human resources, 
export supply capacity and regulatory regimes. Process in implementing the framework has 
been slow, for a variety of reasons. According to a recent report (WTO, 2000b), developing 
countries expect the process to result both in improved delivery of assistance as well as 
increased amounts of funding, while donors focus on the efficiency gains and synergies 
resulting from better coordination. Difficulties in coordination both within the recipients and 
among the agencies have also emerged. The IF was separated from the "best endeavours" 
language found in S&D provisions of WTO Agreements. In many respects, it was a set of 
binding commitments. Hence its early operationalisation could yield some positive results for 
the LDCs. So it is imperative that the IF should be revived, strengthened, and made 
operational as early as possible.  
 
f)  Other Measures  
 
Other measures, which could contribute towards greater integration of the LDCs into the 
world economy, include: 
 
ρ  reducing tariff peaks and tariff escalation on exports from LDCs. 
ρ  expanding commitments by developed and developing countries in respect of 
movement of natural persons under the GATS. 
ρ  restoring the balance between private profit and public good in trade-related aspects 
of intellectual property rights by bringing down the period of exclusivity of ownership 
and creating an institutional mechanism to oversee the actual transfer of technology 
from developed and developing countries to LDCs. 
ρ  doing away with the "WTO plus" conditions for accession and automatically 
extending the S&D provisions to LDCs in the accession process. 
ρ  bringing the WTO dispute settlement mechanism within the financial reach of the 
LDCs by creating a fund for legal assistance for them. 
ρ  extending the transition periods of different WTO Agreements for LDCs where they 
have severe difficulties in meeting deadlines.  
ρ  exempting all LDC exports from any safeguard action in the markets of developing 
and developed countries. 
 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
8.1  The multilateral trading system has the potential to play a vital role in maintaining and 
furthering stable, rules-based trade relations among nations. The LDCs, representing the most 
disadvantaged segments of world trading system, need and deserve generous assistance from 
their developed and developing country partners to integrate into the global economy in a 
manner supportive of their overall development objectives. For achieving this goal, there 
must be continuous and meaningful improvements in market access for LDCs as a 
complement to their own efforts to liberalise their economies. Furthermore, there is the need 
for trade-related technical assistance and capacity-building efforts if the trend towards 
increasing marginalisation is to be reversed. 
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8.2  On a broader canvas, it is observed that although the multilateral negotiating agenda 
has expanded over time, the focus has been on the reduction and abolition of discrimination 
among products and producers. The approach has been one of negative or shallow integration  
-- agreement not to do something. This contrasts with positive or deep integration, which 
involves agreements to pursue common policies (LAWRENCE and LITAN, 1991). Of late, 
there have been some calls for deeper integration at the multilateral level ranging from co-
ordinated application of national policies to the harmonisation of regulatory regimes. 
Attempts to translate such calls into concrete actions in some future round of MTN would 
create further challenges for the LDCs. LDCs must strengthen their institutional capabilities 
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Synoptic Overview of the S&D Provisions of the WTO Agreements 
Recognition of Interests  Fewer Obligations  Implementation Period  Technical Assistance 
1 2 3 4 
MINISTERIAL DECISION ON MEASURES IN FAVOUR OF LDCs 
It is recognised that the effective 
participation of LDCs in the world trading 
system will require improved trade 
opportunities for products of interest to 
them. (Preamble). 
LDCs.... will only be required to apply 
individual commitments, obligations and 
concessions consistent with their 
individual development, financial and 
trade needs, or their administrative and 
institutional capabilities. (Paragraph : 1) 
The LDCs are to be given additional time 
of one year from the Marrakesh Ministerial 
Session ... to submit their schedules as 
required in Article XI of the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO. (Paragraph :1) 
LDCs are to be accorded increased 
technical assistance in developing, 
strengthening and diversifying their 
production and exporting bases including 
those of services. (Paragraph 2 : v) 
Expeditious implementation of all S & D 
measures ... is to be ensured through, inter 
alia, regular reviews. (Paragraph : 2 -i) 
   
Uruguay Round concessions on tariffs and 
non-tariff measures applied on products of 
export interest to LDCs may be 
implemented autonomously, in advance 
and without staging. (Paragraph : 2 - ii) 
   
Rules and transitional provisions resulting 
from the Uruguay Round should be 
applied in a flexible and supportive 
manner for the LDCs. (Paragraph : 2-iii) 
   
When applying import relief measures and 
other measures.... Members are to give 
special consideration to the export interests 
of LDCs. (Paragraph : 2 - iv) 
   
There will a continued review of the 
LDCs' problems and a continued attempt 
to adopt positive measures, which facilitate 
the expansion of their trading 
opportunities. (Paragraph : 3) 
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Recognition of Interests  Fewer Obligations  Implementation Period  Technical Assistance 
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WTO
It is recognised that one of the objectives 
of the WTO will be to ensure that 
developing country Members, and 
especially the LDCs, secure a share in the 
growth of international trade that is 
commensurate with their economic 
development needs. (Preamble) 
 
..... The Committee on Trade and 
Development shall periodically review the 
special provisions in the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements in favour of the LDCs and 
report to the General Council for 
appropriate action. (Article IV : 7) 
 
   
To become original members, LDCs. will 
only be required to undertake 
commitments and concessions to the 
extent consistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade needs, or 
their administrative and institutional 
capabilities. (Article XI :2) 
   
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994 
 
In the case of developing country 
Members, Secretariat background 
documentation will include relevant 
background and analytical material on the 
external trading environ-ment, as well as 
on the BOP situation and prospects of the 
consulting member.(Understanding on 
BOP Provisions, paragraph 12) 
Balance-of-payments consultations may be 
held under simplified procedures in the 
case of LDCs... 
(Understanding on BOP Provisions, 
Paragraph : 8) 
 
Schedules of LDC Members may be 
submitted by 15 April 1995 (instead of 15 
December 1993) (Marrakesh Protocol) 
Technical assistance services of the WTO 
secretariat shall be available to assist any 
developing country member in preparing 
documentation for the BOP consultations. 
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Recognition of Interests  Fewer Obligations  Implementation Period  Technical Assistance 
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
 
Special and Differential treatment to 
developing country members is an integral 
element of the negotiation, and shall be 
applied accordingly (Preamble, and 
Articles 15 : 1 and 20 -C) 
Developing country Members are not 
required to conform to the provision that in 
applying an export prohibition or 
restriction on foodstuffs, due consideration 
should be given to the effect of such a 
measure on importing Members' food 
security.... unless they are net-exporters of 
the concerned foodstuff (Article - 12:2) 
 
LDCs are not required to undertake 
reduction commitments in market access, 
domestic support or export subsidies. 
(Article 15 : 2) 
  
Account is to be taken of the possible 
negative effects of the implementation of 
the reform programme on LDCs and net-
food importing developing country 
Members. (Preamble and Article 16 : 1) 
 
Developed Country Members will provide 
greater market access for agricultural 
products of particular interest to 
developing country Members. (Paragraph 
: 17) 
   
 
 
 CPD Occasional Paper Series 13 
Making the S&D Provisions Effective for the LDCs        20
 
 
Recognition of Interests  Fewer Obligations  Implementation Period  Technical Assistance 
AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SPS MEASURES 
There is a need to assist developing 
country Members in reacting to the special 
difficulties encountered in complying with 
the SPS measures of importing 
countries....and in formulating and 
applying SPS measures in their own 
territories (Preamble). 
 
Members are to take into account the 
special needs of developing country 
Members, and in particular of the LDCs, in 
the preparation and application of SPS 
measures. (Article 10 : 1) 
 
Members should accord longer time-
frames for compliance with their new SPS 
measures on products of interest to 
developing country members ..... (Article 
10:2) 
 
Except in urgent circumstances, Members 
are to allow a reasonable interval between 
the publication and  entry into force of a 
SPS regulation for producers in exporting 
Members, particularly in developing 
country Members, to adapt their products 
and methods of production to these 
requirements. (Annex B, paragraph 2) 
  Upon request, the Committee on SPS 
Measures is enabled to grant to a 
developing country Member specified, 
time-limited exceptions in whole or in 
part, from obligations under this 
Agreement.... (Article 10 : 3) 
 
LDCs may delay, for a period of five years 
following the entry into force of the WTO, 
the application of all of the provisions of 
this Agreement related to their measures 
affecting imports.... (Article 14) 
 
Technical assistance (in the areas of 
processing technologies, research and 
infrastructure and training) will be 
facilitated to developing country Members, 
either bilaterally or multilaterally, so as to 
comply with their trading partners' 
requirements. (Article 9 : 1) 
 
Where substantial investments are required 
in order for an exporting developing 
country Member to fulfil the SPS 
requirements of an importing Member, the 
latter is to consider providing the 
necessary technical assistance. (Article 9 : 
2) 
 
Members should encourage and facilitate 
the active participation of the developing 
country Members in international 
organizations related to SPS regulations 
(Article 10 : 4) 
 
The WTO Secretariat will draw the 
attention of developing country Members 
to any notification relating to products of 
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Recognition of Interests  Fewer Obligations  Implementation Period  Technical Assistance 
AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING
LDCS  should be accorded special 
treatment.  (Preamble)  
 
Exports from LDCS  may benefit ... 
from provisions permitting meaningful 
increases in access possibilities to  small 
suppliers and allowing new entrants to 
trade in the sector to develop commercially 
 significant trading opportunities: exporters 
who are subject to MFA quotas and whose 
restrictions in volume terms are 1.2 per 
cent, or less, of  total restrictions in an 
importing Members as of 31 December 
1991, move ahead one stage in the growth 
process (or equivalent benefit by mutual 
agreement).  
(Article 1:2, Footnote I, and Article 2: 18). 
 
  MFA members without restrictions 
(including a few LDCs) are required to 
notify full details of their first integration 
programme within the 60 days following 
the entry into force of the Agreement, and 
non-MFA members (i.e. most LDCs), 
within the first year of operation (Article 
2:7) 
 
MFA members without  restraints 
(including a few LDCs) have 60 days after 
entry into force of the Agreement, and 
non-MFA members (i.e. most LDCs) have 
6 months, to give notice as to whether they 
wish to have the right to use the special 
transitional safeguard mechanism. (Article 
6:1) 
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Recognition of Interests  Fewer Obligations  Implementation Period  Technical Assistance 
AGREEMENT  ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE
It is recognised that developing country 
Members, which may encounter special 
difficulties in the formulation and 
application of technical regulations and 
standards and procedures for the 
assessment of conformity, may need 
assistance from members of the 
Agreement. (Preamble) 
 
.....Members are to allow a reasonable 
interval between the publication and entry 
into force of a technical regulation.... for 
producers in exporting Members, 
particularly in developing country 
Members, to adapt their products or 
methods of production to these 
requirements (Article 2:12 and 5:9) 
 
The special development, financial and 
trade needs of developing country 
Members shall be taken into account by all 
Members in the implementation and 
operation of the Agreement both nationally 
and multilaterally ... so as to ensure that 
they do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
exports from developing country 
Members. (Articles 12 : 2 and 12 : 3) 
 
Developing country members should not 
be expected to use international standards 
which are not appropriate to their situation, 
as a basis for their technical regulations, 
standards or test methods.  (Article 12 : 4) 
Upon request, a developing country 
member may be granted, by the 
Committee on Technical Barries to Trade, 
specified, time-limited exceptions in whole 
or in part from obligations under this 
Agreement. The Committee shall, in 
particular, take into account the special 
problems of the LDCs.(Article12: 8) 
The WTO Secretariat will draw the 
attention of developing country Members 
to any notification relating to products of 
particular interest to them. (Article 10 : 6) 
 
Priority shall be given to the needs of 
LDCs in providing technical assistance 
(upon request on mutually agreed terms 
and conditions). There is full obligation for 
all Members to provide technical 
assistance to developing country Members 
.... With regard to the preparation of 
technical regulations ; the establishment of 
national standardizing bodies and 
participation in international standardizing 
bodies; the steps to be taken by developing 
country producers to have access to 
systems for conformity assessment within 
the territory of the Member receiving the 
request ; and the establishment of the 
institutions and legal framework necessary 
to fulfil the obligations of membership or 
participation in these systems. (Article 11) 
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Members shall take such reasonable 
measures as may be available to them to 
ensure that : the organization and operation 
of international standardizing bodies and 
international systems....take into account 
the special problems of developing country 
Members. (Articles 12 : 5 and 12 : 6) 
 
The special development, financial and 
trade needs of developing country 
Members shall be taken into account by 
developed country Members ... in 
formulating and implementing standards, 
technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures.  
(Article 12 : 9) 
 
The Committee on TBT will periodically 
examine the special and differential 
treatment granted to developing country 
Members. (Article 12 : 10) 
 
 
    Terms and conditions of technical 
assistance will be determined in light of 
the stage of development of the members, 
particularly in the case of LDCs. (Article 
12 : 7). 
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AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES 
 
 
It is recognised that the expansion and 
progressive liberalization of trade and 
investment across international frontiers .... 
is to take into account the particular trade, 
development and financial needs of 
developing country Members, particularly 






Particular recognition is given to the right 
of the developing country members to 
temporarily apply TRIMS figuring in the 
Illustrative List in accordance with GATT 
Article XVIII : C...... and rules on BOP 
safeguard measures. (Article 4) 
 
LDC members will have a seven-year 
transitional period to eliminate all GATT 
inconsistent TRIMS. (Article 5 : 2)  
 
A developing country Member which 
demonstrates particular difficulties in 
implementing the provisions of the 
Agreement may have the transitional 
period extended by a decision by the 
Council for Trade in Goods. (Article 5 : 3) 
 
 
AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI OF GATT (ANTI-DUMPING) 
 
Special regard must be given by developed 
country Members to the special situation 
of developing country Members when 
considering the application of anti-
dumping measures. (Article 15) 
 
The possibility of finding constructive 
remedies provided by the Agreement has 
to be explored before applying anti-
dumping duties which affect the essential 
interests of developing country members. 
(Article 15) 
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AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VII OF GATT (CUSTOMS VALUATION)
There is a recognition that the Agreement 
attempts to secure additional benefits for 
the trade of developing country Members. 
(Preamble) 
Developing country Members may make a 
reservation permitting them to refuse a 
request from the importer to reverse the 
order of the fourth and fifth methods of 
valuation. (Annex III : 3) 
 
A developing country Member may 
reserve the right to value imported goods 
on the basis of the unit price of post-
importation sale if the goods have 
undergone further processing in the 
country of importation. In such cases, this 
method of valuation shall be applied 
whether or not the importer so requests. 
(Annex III : 4) 
Developing country Members which are 
not signatories of the Tokyo Round... have 
a grace period of five years before 
applying the provisions of the Agreement. 
They have also the possibility of 
requesting an extension of this period.  
(Article 20 : 1 and Annex III : 1) 
 
Developing Country Members.... have-- 
over and above the five years mentioned 
above -- an additional delay period of three 
years for the application of the Articles 
relating to the computed value 
methodology. (Article 20 : 2) 
 
Developing country members may make a 
reservation to retain an otherwise 
prohibited system of officially established 
minimum values on a limited and 
transitional basis under such terms and 
conditions as may be agreed by the 
Committee. (Annex II:2 and Text I) 
Developing country Members have the 
right to request, and obtain, technical 
assistance from developed country 
Members. (Article 20 : 3) 
 
If a developing country member finds it is 
encountering a problem regarding the non-
inclusion in the customs value of special 
discounts and commissions obtained by 
sole agents, sole concessionaires, and sole 
distributors, it can request that a study be 
made with a view to finding appropriate 
solutions. (Annex III : 5) 
 
The Committee on Customs Valuation 
urges the Customs Cooperation Council to 
formulate and conduct studies in areas 
identified as being of potential concern to 
developing country Members, including 
those related to importations by sole 
agents, sole distributors and sole 
concessionaires (Text II) 
AGREEMENT ON PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION
It is noted that developing country 
Members have recourse to PSI, and their 
need to do so for so long and insofar as it 
is necessary to verify the quality, quantity 
or price of imported goods is recognised. 
(Preamble) 
    Exporter Members shall offer to provide to 
user Members-- i.e. developing country 
Members -- upon request, technical 
assistance on mutually agreed terms on a 
bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral basis. 
(Article 3 : 3)  
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AGREEMENT ON IMPORT LICENSING  PROCEDURES
Members are to take into account the 
particular trade, development and financial 
needs of developing country Members. ( 
Preamble)  
 
When ensuring that the administrative 
procedures implementing import licensing 
regimes are in conformity with  GATT   
Provisions... Members are to take into 
account the trade, development and 
financial needs of developing country 
Members. (Article 1: 2) 
 
In allocating licenses among importers, 
Members should give special consideration 
to those importers importing products 
orginating in developing country Members 
and, in particular, in LDCs. (Article 3: 5) 
Members using non-automatic import 
licensing regimes are to provide all 
relevant information concerning the 
administration of restrictions, import 
licenses granted over a recent period and 
import statistics of the products concerned. 
Developing country Members are not 
expected to undertake additional 
administrative or financial  burdens in 
fulfilling this latter requirement. (Article 
3:5) 
A developing country Member which is 
not currently a signatory of the Tokyo 
Round Agreement may... delay by a 
maximum of two years the implementation 
of the two following obligations : (a) to 
accept applications for automatic licenses 
on any working day prior to the customs 
clearance of the goods, and (b) to grant 
automatic licenses immediately on 
receipt... 
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AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
For the time period when export subsidies and subsidies contingent upon the use 
of domestic over imported goods granted by developing country Members are 
permitted, the relevant provision for dispute resolution is that relating to 
actionable subsidies and not that relating to prohibited subsidies. (Article 27:7) 
 
While actionable subsidies specified in Article 6:1 ....... are in general presumed 
to result in serious prejudice, such a presumption will not apply in the case of 
developing country Members. In these cases, serious prejudice has to be 
demonstrated on the basis of positive evidence. (Article 27:8) 
 
Actionable subsidies ..... granted by developing country Members are only 
actionable if they cause injury to an industry in the complainant's market, or 
nullify or impair other  Members' benefits under GATT 1994 by displacing or 
impeding imports of like products into the subsidizing developing country 
Member's market. Serious prejudice ... is not actionable. (Article 27:9) 
 
Termination of a countervailing investigation is required when the volume of 
subsidized imports from a developing country member is negligible... (Article 
27 : 10 ) 
 
During eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, 
termination of countervailing duty investigations against an LDC is required 
when the level of subsidization is de minimis... (Article 27 : 10) 
 
The Subsidies Committee shall.... review the consistency of a Member's 
countervailing measure with the obligation to provide special and differential 
treatment for developing country Members. (Article 27 : 15) 
 
Direct forgiveness of debt and certain other subsidies are not actionable under 
multilateral rules when such subsidies are granted within, and directly linked to, 






LDCs are not subject to the 
prohibition on export subsidies 
applicable to other WTO 
Members. (Article 27 :2) 
The prohibition of the granting of 
subsidies on the use of domestic 
over imported goods does not apply 
to LDC  Members for a period of 
eight years. (Article 27: 3) 
 
An LDC Member which attains 
"export competitiveness"....... has to 
phase out export subsidies on such 
product within eight years. (Article 
27:5) 
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AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS
Imports originating in a developing 
country Member will be exempt from 
safeguard measures if (a) the share of 
imports of the product from the developing 
country Member in the total imports of 
that product in the importing Member does 
not exceed 3 per cent; and (b) the 
developing country Members with less 
than 3 per cent import share, collectively 
do not account for more than 9 per cent of 
the total imports of the product concerned 
in the importing Member.(Article 9:1) 
Developing country Members are 
permitted to maintain their safeguard 
measures for two years longer than the 
maximum allowed for other Members, i.e. 
for 10 instead of 8 years. (Article 9 : 2) 
  
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
 
Due to the asymmetries existing with 
respect to the degree of development of 
services regulations in different Member 
countries, the particular need of 
developing country Members to exercise 
their right to regulate the supply of 
services in order to meet national policy 
objectives is recognised. (Preamble) 
 
It is recognised that the serious difficulty 
of the LDCs should be taken into account 
in view of their special economic situation 
and their development, trade and financial 
needs. (Preamble) 
For developing country Members... 
flexibility is provided for in meeting the 
conditions... The flexibility allowed for is 
in accordance with the level of 
development of the Members concerned, 
both overall and in individual sectors and 
sub-sectors. (Article V : 3) 
 
Appropriate flexibility will be provided for 
individual developing country Members 
for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing 
fewer types of transactions, progressively 
extending market access in line with their 
development situation... (Article XIX : 2) 
 
Developing country Members are allowed 
flexibility with respect to the time-limit for 
establishing enquiry points over and 




Technical assistance to developing country 
Members is to be provided at the 
multilateral level by the WTO Secretariat 
and will be decided upon by the Council 
for Trade in Services.  
(Article XXVI : 2) 
 
Members endorse and encourage the 
participation... of developing country 
Members.... in the development 
programmes of international and regional 
organizations (including the ITU, the 
UNDP and the World Bank). 
 
(Annex on Telecommunications, 
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Priority is to be given to LDCs in the process of the 
negotiation of specific commitments to facilitate their 
increasing participation in world trade.... Members are 
to take particular account of the serious difficulty of the 
LDCs in accepting negotiated specific commitments in 
view of their special economic situation and their 
development, trade and financial needs. (Article IV : 1) 
Consistent with their levels of 
development, developing country 
Members may place reasonable 
conditions on access to, and use of, 
public telecommunications 
transport networks and services. 
(Annex on Telecommunications, 
paragraph 5 : 8) 
  Members shall encourage and support 
telecommunications cooperation among 
developing country Members at the 
international, regional and sub-regional level. 
(Annex on Telecommunications, paragraph 6 -b) 
Special priority will be given to the LDCs in 
facilitating the access of their service suppliers to 
information relating to the respective markets, relative 
to commercial and technical aspects of the supply of 
services, registration, recognition and obtaining of 
professional qualifica-tions, and the availability of 
services technology. (Article IV:2) 
    Members will make information ... available to 
developing country members to assist in 
strengthening their domestic 
telecommunications services sector in 
cooperation with relevant international 
organizations. (Annex on Telecommunications, 
paragraph 6-c) 
..... The role of subsidies in relation to the development 
programmes of developing country members will be 
recognised and the needs of developing country 
members will be taken into account, particularly in 
providing for flexibility in this area. (Article XV : 1) 
    Special consideration will be given to 
opportunities for the LDCs to encourage 
foreign suppliers of telecommunications 
services to assist in the transfer of technology, 
training and other activities that support the 
development of their telecommunications 
infrastructure and expansion of their 
telecommunications services trade. (Annex on 
Telecommunications, Paragraph 6 -d). 
 
The sectoral committees will provide technical 
assistance to developing country Members..... 
in respect of matters affecting trade in services 
in the sectors concerned. (Decision on 
Institutional Arrangements for the GATS, 
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AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
The special needs of LDCs in respect of 
maximum flexibility in the domestic 
implementation of the laws and regulations so as 
to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base are recognised. (Preamble) 
  LDCs may delay for eleven years the date 
of application of the provisions of the 
Agreement. The Council for TRIPS shall 
extend their period upon a duly motivated 
request from a LDC. (Article 66:1) 
Developed country Members shall provide 
incentives to enterprises and institutions in 
their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology 
transfer to LDCs, in order to enable them 
to create a sound and viable technological 
base. (Article 66:2) 
 
      Developed country members are to 
provide..... technical and financial 
cooperation in favour of developing and 
LDC members including assistance in the 
preparation of domestic legislation on the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, as well as on the 
prevention of their abuse. (Article 67) 
UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
 
Developing countries are entitled to the good 
offices of the Director-General and a panel 
procedure with shorter time limits, as a partial 
alternative to this understanding. (Article : 3 :12) 
    There shall be a qualified legal expert from 
the WTO technical cooperation services to 
provide legal advice and assistance for 
developing countries. (Article 27:2) 
If the dispute involves an LDC... Members are to 
exercise restraint in raising matters under the 
dispute settlement procedures, asking for 
compensation, seeking authoriza-tion for 
retaliation or other obligations pursuant to these 
procedures. (Article 24:1) 
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During consultations, Members should give special attention to the 
particular problems and interests of developing country Members. 
(Article 4 : 10) 
 
    
In the context of consultations involving a measure taken by a 
developing country Member, the parties may agree to extend the 
periods established for consultations.... After the relevant period has 
elapsed.... the Chairman of the DSB shall decide whether to extend 
the period. (Article 12 :10) 
 
    
If consultations involving an LDC fail, it can request the Director 
General or the DSB Chairman to offer his good offices before a 
request for a panel is made. (Article 24 : 2) 
    
When a dispute is between a developing country member and a 
developed country member, the panel shall, include at least one 
panelist from a developing country Member. (Article 8:10) 
    
In examining a complaint against a developing country member, the 
panel shall accord sufficient time for the developing country member 
to prepare and present its argumentation. (Article 12:10) 
    
Where one or more members is a developing country, the panel's 
report shall explicitly indicate how special and differential provisions 
raised by the developing country have been taken into account. 
(Article 12:11) 
    
When keeping the implementation of adopted recommendations or 
ruling under surveillance, particular attention should be paid to 
matters affecting the interests of developing countries. (Article 21:2) 
    
If the case has been brought by a developing country, the DSB will 
consider what further action ... night be taken, taking into account 
not only the trade coverage of measures complained of, but also their 
impact on the economy of the developing country Member. (Article 
21:7 and 21:8) 
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TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM 
 
  The majority of developing countries are 
subject to review every six years. Longer 
intervals may be prescribed for LDCs. 
(Section C:ii) 
  The WTO secretariat shall make available 
technical assistance on request to 
developing country members, particularly 
to LDCs, in the compilation of their 
national reports. (Section - D) 
  Some flexibility might be needed by LDCs 
in compiling their reports... (Section D) 
 
  
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE WTO TO ACHIEVING GREATER COHERENCE IN GLOBAL POLICY - MAKING
It is recognised that there is a need for an 
adequate and timely flow of concessional 
and non-concessional financial and real 
investment resources to developing 
country members, and for further efforts to 
address debt problems, to help ensure 
economic growth and development. 
(Paragraph 2) 
   
There is also a recognition that trade 
liberalization forms an increasingly 
important component in the success of the 
adjustment programmes that many 
members are undertaking, and that this 
often involves significant transitional 
social costs... (Paragraph 2) 
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MINISTERIAL DECISION ON MEASURES CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE REFORM PROGRAMME ON LEAST-DEVELOPED 
AND NET FOOD-IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
A periodical review of the level of food aid established 
by the Committee on Food Aid under the Food Aid 
Convention will be held... to meet the legitimate needs 
of the developing country members during the reform 
programme. (Paragraph 3-i) 
    Full consideration will be given in the context of Members' aid 
programmes to requests for the provision of technical and 
financial assistance to LDCs and net food importing developing 
country Members to improve their agricultural productivity and 
infrastructure. (Paragraph 3-iii) 
Guidelines will be adopted that ensure that an increasing 
proportion of basic foodstuffs is provided to the LDCs 
and net food-importing developing country members in 
the form of a grant, or on appropriate concessional terms 
in line with Article IV of the Food Aid Convention. 
(Paragraph 3- ii) 
 
    
It will be ensured that any agreement relating  to 
agricultural  export credits makes appropriate provision  
for differential treatment  in favour of LDCs and net 
food importing developing country Members. 
(Paragraph  4) 
 
    
Members experiencing difficulties short-term difficulties  
in financing normal levels of commercial imports may 
be eligible to draw on the  resources of international 
financial institutions under existing facilities. ....... 
(Paragraph  5) 
 
    
MINISTERIAL DECISION ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES 
 
The Council for Trade in Goods will undertake a review of 
notification obligations and procedures. In undertaking the 
review, the possible need of some developing Members for 
assistance in meeting their notification obligations will be borne 
in mind. (Part  III) 
     
CPD 
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